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Down in Flames: Three U.S. Courts Decline
Recognition to Judgments from Mexico, Citing
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ToTHY G. NELSON*

Abstract
Within the United States, variouslaws and procedures allowfor the potential enforcement and
recognition ofjudgments rendered in foreign countries. Approximately two-thirds of U.S. states
have enacted unform laws specifically providing for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
county judgments. Recognition ofjudgments is also potentially available undercommon law principles of comity. In either case, a number of important exceptions to recognitionexist, including the
so-called 'fraud" exception-under which a foreign judgment will not be recognized if it was the
product of bribery or other corrupt conduct.
Although U.S. courts will not lightly infer that a foreign judgment was the product of fraud,
they will nonetheless take fraud allegationsseriously and will not hesitate to decline recognition if
fraud allegationsare properly made out. This article examines three recent cases, each involving
judgments rendered by the courts of Mexico, where the United States courts declined recognition of
such judgments on the grounds that they were tainted by bribery and/orotherjudicialmisconduct.

* TimoTHY G. NELSON iS a New York partner of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP,
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governed by the United Nations Conunission on International Trade Law rules, and has litigated numerous
high-profile international cases before U.S. federal and state courts, including cases governed by the New
York Convention, the Hague Service Convention and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. He represents
corporate clients from a broad range of sectors, including energy, infrastructure, mining, cement, finance,
insurance, brewing, pharmaceuticals, hotels and property investment, and also advises sovereign entities. His
arbitration cases include contractual, corporate, and accounting disputes as well as investment treaty/
expropriation claims against foreign goverunents. He is published extensively on issues involving
international arbitration and cross-border litigation and has participated in key professional bar association
committees. Born in Australia, he holds law degrees from the University of New South Wales and Oxford
University. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are not those of his firm or the
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Introduction

U.S. courts frequently afford recognition to judgments emanating from the courts of
foreign countries. In most states, uniform legislation regulates the enforcement of foreign
country money judgments; in other states, common law allows recognition under the doctrine of "comity." These rules seek to ensure that the decisions of foreign courts are
respected, and to prevent disputes resolved in those courts from being re-litigated in the
United States.
The preparedness of U.S. courts to recognize foreign judgments, even those of its closest neighbors such as Mexico, is not unbounded. Exceptions exist, including the rule that
a judgment that has been obtained by "fraud," including bribery or corruption, will not be
recognized.
Alleging "fraud" can be a daunting prospect for a litigant. U.S. judges are understandably reluctant to cast aspersions on their foreign counterparts, particularly those of neighboring countries. The party raising fraud also risks "burning its bridges" with the original
court. Nevertheless, where evidence of fraud exists, U.S. courts have been prepared to
act, as three recent cases involving Mexico have illustrated. This article explores those
cases in the general framework of U.S. uniform legislation on judgment enforcement.

H. Rules Relating to the Recognition of Foreign Judgments in the United
States
The modern system of recognizing foreign money judgments in the United States derives from the landmark case of Hilton v. Guyot, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held
that "comity" could serve as a basis to "allow . . full effect" to judgments made by foreign
"court[s] of competent jurisdiction."' Although enforcement of foreign judgments remains a question of state law, 2 Hilton v. Guyot is binding federal common law in cases
1. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895) ("[W]e are satisfied that where there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular
proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence
likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of
other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under
which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of this
nation should not allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not ... be tried afresh ... upon the mere
assertion ... that the judgment was erroneous in law or in fact."). Although this article deals primarily with
the rules concerning recognition leading to enforcement of judgments, it should be noted that, beyond the
enforcement context, federal and state law also contains a body of rules concerning claims and issue preclusion (res judicata and issue estoppel) potentially applicable to foreign judgments. See Cedric C. Chao &
Christine S. Neuhoff, Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign Judgments in United States Courts: A Practical
Perspective, 29 PEPP. L. REv. 147, 159-60 (2001); see generally Robert C. Casad, Lane Preclusion and Foreign
Country Judgments: Whose Law?, 70 IowA L. REv. 53 (1984) (discussing issue preclusion and foreign
judgments).
2. See Phillips USA, Inc. v. Allflex USA, Inc., 77 F.3d 354, 359 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Unless and until some
federal statute or treaty declares otherwise, it is state, not federal, law that governs the effect to be given
foreign judgments.") (quoting Casad, supra note 1, at 78 (citing, inter alia, RESTATEsrr (SECOND) OF
CoN'ruc-r OF LAWS < 98 cmt. c (1989)).
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involving a "federal question," 3 and has proven highly persuasive in the development of
state law.
In 1962, in an effort to encourage recognition of foreign judgments by U.S. courts, and
to induce foreign courts to give similar treatment to U.S. judgments, a uniform recognition statute-the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act-was published
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.4 This legislation
was adopted in approximately two-thirds of U.S. states, plus the District of Columbia and
the U.S. Virgin Islands. 5 A 2005 revised statute, the Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act, intended to update and supersede the 1962 statute, is now
6
also gaining acceptance.
Both of the uniform recognition statutes provide for recognition and enforcement of
7
final money judgments from "courts of competent jurisdiction" in foreign countries.
Once recognized, these judgments have the same effect as a U.S. domestic court judgment. Thus, using Mexico as an example, states that adopted the 1962 or 2005 Uniform
Acts extend recognition to decisions of the various courts of Mexico, provided all statutory
prerequisites have been met and no exceptions apply.8
In states that have not enacted the uniform legislation, recognition of foreign judgments
may be available at common law, including as stated in Hilton v. Guyot.9 Using Mexico
again as an example, an Arizona court granted common law recognition to a judgment
3. "In federal-question cases . . . federal courts apply a federal standard to recognition of foreign judgments." Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantialis Our Need for a Judgments-Recognition Convention and What
Should We BargainAway to Get It?, 24 BRooKLYN J. INT'L L. 167, 177 (1998); see also id. at 173-74 n.40
(collecting authorities).
4. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTs RECOGNITION AcT 13 Part I U.L.A. 36 (1962) (Supp. 2002)

(hereinafter 1962 UNIF. ACr).
5. Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, A Few Facts About the ... Uniform Foreign Money
Judgments Recognition Act, http://www.nccusl.org/necusl/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufmjra.asp
(last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
6. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION Ac-T 13 Part I U.L.A. 7 (2005) (Supp.

2009) (hereinafter 2005 UNIv. AcT). The 2005 Uniform Act has been adopted by 12 states, almost all of
which had previously enacted the 1962 Uniform Act. See Nat'1 Conf. of Com'rs on Unif. State Laws, A
Few Facts About the . . . Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, http://
www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufcmjra.asp (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). By its
terms, the 2005 Uniform Act repeals and supersedes the 1962 Uniform Act for all actions commenced after
its enactment. 2005 UNIF. AcT. A rival statute, drafted by the American Law Institute, is devised as a federal
statute that would pre-empt state law (including the 1962 and 2005 Uniform Acts). See FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT AcT (Proposed Official Draft 2006), reprinted in Am. LAw
INsT., RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL
STATUTE (2006) (hereinafter ALI DRAFT FEDERAL STAT.); see also Vishali Singal, Preserving Power Without
SacrificingJustice: Creatingan Effective Reciprocity Regime for the Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignJudgments, 59 HASTINGs L.J. 943 (2008) (analyzing ALI Draft Federal Statute). At the present date, however, the
ALI draft has not been adopted.
7. 2005 UNIF. AcT §§ 3-4; 1962 UNIF. AcT §§ 2-4.
8. See, e.g., Southwest Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Ramon, 169 F.3d 317, 323 (5th Cit. 1999) (holding
that a Mexican judgment was entitled to recognition under the Texas version of the 1962 Uniform Act);
Tenorio Plata v. Darbun Enters., Inc., No. 09cv44-IEG(CAB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30626, at *15 (S.D.
Cal. Apr. 9, 2009) (declining to dismiss an application under California's version of the 2005 Uniform Act for
enforcement of a judgment by a Tijuana labor tribunal). On reciprocity requirements, see infra 107-09, nn.
12-19.
9. See, e.g., Phillips USA, 77 F.3d at 359 (recognizing Australian judgment on grounds of comity because
"[n]othing in Kansas statute or case law suggests that it would not follow the principles set out in Hilton v.
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from the courts of Cuidad Obregon, even though Arizona had not adopted the 1962 Uniform Act.IO In this regard, some have gone further and argued that the 1962 Uniform Act
represents a codification of contemporary state common law, given the similarities between it and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. I One
court has gone so far as to state that "[a]lthough not all jurisdictions have independently
codified the [1962 Uniform Act], [it] may be looked on as the 'state of law' throughout the
United States."l2

Significantly, several states that adopted the 1962 Uniform Act did so with an important
modification requirement, "reciprocity" of treatment.13 In such states, judgments from a
foreign country will not qualify for recognition under the statute unless it is shown that
that country itself would give similar treatment to U.S. judgments.' 4 This restriction met
with strong opposition both from the drafters of the 1962 and 2005 Uniform Acts, who
"consciously rejected" it.'s Some courts have also declined to recognize this doctrine as
being part of state common law,16 and others have recognized that it has "practical limGuyot"); Spann v. Compania Mexicana Radiodifusora Fronteriza, S.A., 131 F.2d 609, 611 (5th Cir. 1942)
(recognizing a Mexican award of litigation costs).
10. Feuchter A. v. Bozurto, 528 P.2d 178, 180 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974) (affording recognition to Mexican
judgment on grounds of comity). On Arizona's lack of a legislative regime for foreign judgment enforcement,
see Multibanco Comermex, S.A. v. Gonzalez H., 630 P.2d 1053, 1053 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that
Arizona's confusingly-worded "foreign judgments" statute only applied to domestic "sister state" judgments).
The confusing name of Arizona's "foreign judgments" statute reflects the problem created by a 1948 uniform
law known as the "Uniform Foreign Judgments Act," which regulates the grant of "full faith and credit" to
domestic sister-state judgments. See UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTs AcT § 1(a), 13 Part II
U.L.A. 246, 248 (1948). In an effort to reduce this confusion, the 2005 Uniform Act refers to "Foreign
Countr[ies]" in its title. See generallyJames 0. Ehinger, Enforcement of Foreign Country Judgments in Arizona,
33 ARIz. Arr'y, Mar. 1997, at 20 (discussing Arizona case and statutory law and the uniform laws).
11. See, e.g., Van den Biggelasr v. Wagner, 978 F. Supp. 848, 853, 860-61 nn.14-15 (N.D. Ind. 1997)
(utilizing 1962 Uniform Act to inform the content of Indiana law on the enforcement of Dutch judgment,
even though Indiana had not enacted the 1962 Uniform Act). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON FOREIGN
REL. LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 481-84 (1987) (restating common law grounds for recognition or
nonrecognition of foreign judgments); Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United
States: In Search of Uniformity and InternationalAcceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 253, 266-67 (1991)
(comparing judgment-recognition provisions of the Restatement (Third) with 1962 Uniform Act).
12. Van den Biggelaar, 978 F. Supp. at 860 n.14 (utilizing 1962 Uniform Act as indicating the content of
Indiana law on the enforcement of Dutch judgment, even though Indiana had not enacted the 1962 Uniform
Act).
13. The states that imposed a reciprocity requirement include Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Texas,
Idaho, and Ohio. See id. at 860 n.15. Colorado law required reciprocity until recently. See infra note 72.
14. See, e.g., Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 1005-06 (5th Cit. 1990)
(affirming the denial of recognition to a judgment from Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, based on the
Texas reciprocity proviso to the 1962 Uniform Act, citing an affidavit by a U.S. attorney practicing in Abu
Dhabi, stating that he and other members of his firm were "unaware of any Abu Dhabi courts enforcing
United States' judgments"); see also Singal, supra note 6, at 944-45 (analyzing Banque Libanaise).
15. Van den Biggelaar,978 F. Supp. at 859 n.12; see also 2005 UNIF. Act, Prefatory Note ("While recognition of U.S. judgments continues to be problematic in a number of foreign countries, there was insufficient
evidence to establish that a reciprocity requirement would have a greater effect on encouraging foreign recognition of U.S. judgments than does the approach taken by the Act.").
16. See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 n.8 (3d Cit. 1972) (holding
reciprocity not required under Pennsylvania law; permitting English judgment to be enforced); Tahan v.
Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 867-68 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (reciprocity not required to enforce Israeli judgment);
Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 122-24 (N.Y. 1926) (holding that reciprocity is not required by New York law).
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its."1 Yet, in some states at least, there remains some basis for arguing that a reciprocity
requirement exists at common law, 18 and the ALI proposed law would seek to revive the
doctrine in its proposed federal statute (which would preempt state law, including the
1962 and 2005 Uniform Acts).' 9 Unless, and until, a widespread international judgment
recognition comes into existence (and none exists yet),20 the doctrine will remain a potentially significant roadblock to recognition in some parts of the United States.

II.

Rules Relating to Corruption in Foreign Courts

A. THE "FRAUD"

EXCEPTION

Even where a foreign money judgment is proven to be final, binding, and made by a
court of competent jurisdiction, there are a number of exceptions to recognition; among
the most important and well-established is that "[a] foreign judgment need not be recognized if ... the judgment was obtained by fraud."21 Other grounds for non-recognition
include lack of jurisdiction, public policy, denial of due process (e.g., the defendant received insufficient time to respond), breach of forum selection agreement, and forum non
conveniens. 22
The 1962 Uniform Act did not contain a definition of "fraud," thus allowing courts to
develop its meaning. A distinction has come to be recognized between two types of
"fraud":
* "Extrinsic fraud," e.g., bribery or corruption of court officials that induces the
court to grant a judgment in favor of the prevailing party; and
* "Intrinsic fraud," e.g., the use of perjured testimony or forged documents to obtain
judgment.
17. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 1997) (commenting obiter dictum on the
practical limits" of a reciprocity rule in the recognition of foreign judgments: "[i]f a litigant sought recognition of a Djibouti judgment in Montana, for example, it is unlikely that Djibouti would have had the prior
opportunity to consider recognition of a Montana judgment").
18. See Van den Biggelaar,978 F. Supp. at 859 n.12. Some, however, argue in favor of retaining the reciprocity requirement. E.g., Richard H. M. Maloy & Desamparados M. Nisi, A Message to the Supreme Court:
The Next ime You Get a Chance, Please Look at Hilton v. Guyot; We Think it Needs Repairing, 5 J. IrT'L LEGAL
STUD. 1, 39-42 (1999) (forcefully arguing for retention of common law reciprocity requirement, albeit in a
modified form).
19. See ALI DRuvr FEDERAL STAT. § 7.

20. In 2005, the Hague Conference on Private International Law promulgated a Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements, which would require recognition and enforcement of judgments in cases where the parties
had entered into a binding and valid choice of court agreement. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on Choice of Court Agreements arts. 8-9, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M.1294, available at
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98. Should the United States proceed to ratify
this convention, it will create a limited reciprocal agreement between the contracting parties, applicable in
cases where a forum selection clause exists. At the moment, however, "[the United States is not a party to
any convention or bilateral agreement on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments." Efforts
were made to conclude such a treaty with the United Kingdom in 1977, "but it was ultimately blocked by the
U.K insurance industry, which was nervous about the enforcement of U.S. tort judgments against them in
U.K courts." Sean D. Murphy, Negotiation of Convention on Juridiction and Enforcement offudgments, 95 AM.
J. INr'L. L. 418, 419 (2001).
21. 1962 UNIF. AcT §4(b)(2); see also Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-03 (noting that "fraud in procuring the
judgment" may be a ground for denying comity at common law).
22. See 1962 UNIF. Acr §§ 4(a), (b).
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Over time, many commentators concluded that the "fraud" exception was aimed primarily at protecting against extrinsic fraud, because a court whose procedures are tainted by
bribery or corruption is not capable of providing a fair hearing, nor is such a court neces23
sarily capable of redressing the consequences of its own corrupt activity. By contrast, a
court that is not corrupt is arguably capable of addressing, for instance, belated revelations
that a key witness had lied under oath; therefore, intrinsic fraud can be redressed in the
court that rendered the original judgment (on the basis that that court is not tainted by
fraud).
The drafters embraced this distinction in the 2005 Uniform Act, which now only permits non-recognition for extrinsic fraud, i.e., 'fraud that deprived the losing party of an ade24
As the National Conference explained, "intrinsic
quate opportunity to present its case."

fraud" should not be raised before U.S. courts, but instead "should be raised and dealt
with in the rendering court." 25 Despite this refinement of the "fraud" exception, the 2005
revisions leave little doubt that actual bribery of foreign court officials, or similarly blatant
forms of corruption, would continue to qualify as a form of extrinsic "fraud" that could
lead to non-recognition of a foreign judgment, not least because it is sometimes difficult
to obtain effective redress from the same court that had engaged in bribery.
B. THE EXCEPTION FOR COUNTRIES WHOSE JUSTICE SYSTEMs ARE
FUNDAMENTALLY IMPAIRED

Both the 1962 and 2005 Uniform Acts provide for non-recognition of judgments emanating from countries where fair justice is essentially unavailable, i.e., if "[t]he judgment
was rendered under a system which [sic] does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law." 26 This exception was also
noted in the court's discussion in Hilton v. Guyot of the grounds for refusing common law
recognition of judgments. 27 Under this exception, "'mere difference[s]"' between the foreign procedure and the U.S. procedure is not enough, "'[a] case of serious injustice must
be involved"' sufficient to question "the basic fairness of the foreign-country procedure." 28 A classic example of a country whose judgments were denied recognition on this
ground was post-revolutionary Iran, whose courts were considered to possess an en29
trenched bias against the former royal family.
It is also possible that this exception might be employed in the context of bribery and
corruption. Indeed, in its commentary to the 2005 Uniform Act, the National Confer-

ence stated that this exception would apply if it were proven "that corruptionand bribery is
23. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FoREIGN REL. LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES § 482 cmt. e (1987)

(stating that "fraud" exception should mean extrinsic fraud, i.e., "fraudulent action by the prevailing party that
deprived the losing party of adequate opportumity to present its case to the court").
24. 2005 UNIF. AcT § 4(c)(2) (emphasis added).

25. Id. cmt. 7.
26. 1962 UNIF. Acr § 4(a)(1); accord 2005 UNIF. AcT § 4(b)(1).
27. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 204-05.
28. 2005 UNIF. Acr § 4 cmt. 5 (quoting 1962 UNTIF. AcT § 4 cmt.).
29. Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that post-revolutionary
Iranian judicial system did not afford protections compatible with due process).
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[sic] so prevalent throughout the judicial system of the foreign country as to make that entire
3
judicial system one that does not provide impartial tribunals."o
Historically, U.S. courts have been reluctant to make across-the-board findings that an

entire sovereign-country's courts are endemically corrupt or prone to bribery.31 But one
court found, in a case involving 1990s Liberia, that a party successfully resisted recognition of Liberian judgments based on State Department reports that the country was so
plagued with civil war and corruption that its courts could not be relied upon. 32 A similar
33
finding was once made in connection with Paraguay, in a forum non conveniens context.
of
Florida
More recently, a judge of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
refused to enforce a Nicaraguan judgment on a variety of grounds, including that the
Nicaraguan judicial system was such that the judgment was "'rendered under a system
which does not provide impartial tribunals'"-a finding that was based on "persuasive
evidence that direct political interference and judicial corruption in Nicaragua is
34
widespread."
In the case of present-day Mexico, no U.S. court has suggested that corruption is so

pervasive or endemic that its courts are generally unreliable; on the contrary, U.S. courts
30. 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4 cmt. 11 (emphasis added).
31. See, e.g., In re Arbitration between Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine,
311 F.3d 488, 499 (2d Cir. 2002) (rejecting, in a forum non conveniens application, the claim that the courts
of the Ukraine are corrupt); Universal Trading & Inv. Co. v. Kiritchenko, No. C-99-3073 MMC, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 66317, at *49-50 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2007) ("[Tjhe Court finds UTI has not demonstrated that
the Ukrainian courts are so lacking in impartiality, due process, or procedural fairness that the United States
courts should disregard all Ukrainian court decisions as a matter of course, or the particular decisions at issue
herein.").
32. See Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) (refusing to enforce Liberian judgment based on U.S. State Department reports indicating that "Liberia's judicial system was in a state of
disarray and the provisions of the Constitution concerning the judiciary were no longer followed").
33. In one case, a plaintiff persuaded a New York federal judge that Paraguay's justice system as it existed in
2000 precluded any chance of a fair trial. See HSBC USA, Inc. v. Prosegur Paraguay, S.A., 03 Civ. 0336,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19750, at *10-12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004) (crediting evidence that "Paraguay was
ranked the fourth most corrupt country in the world" and that "[a] State Department report issued in February 2000 noted that denials of fair trials are common in Paraguay and the courts are often pressured by
politicians and other persons whose interests are at stake").
34. Sanchez Osorio v. Dole Food Co., No. 07-22693-CIV-HUCK, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99981, at *125
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 2009) (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.605(l)(a)). The Sanchez Osorio case is part of a series
of long-running claims by Nicaraguan agricultural workers against U.S. companies allegedly responsible for
making or using an agricultural pesticide, dibromochloropropane (DBCP). After the plaintiffs' attempts to
bring suit against the U.S. companies in the courts of Texas were dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds, the Nicaraguan legislature enacted a special law providing for such actions to be brought in Nicaragua, and further providing a number of unorthodox features that "deliberately tilt[ed] the scales of justice in
the plaintiffs' favor." Id. at *43. In 2005, a Nicaraguan court rendered a judgment awarding certain plaintiffs
a total of $97 million against two U.S. defendants. In its 2009 opinion refusing to recognize the judgment,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida held, as noted above, that the Nicaraguan judicial
system was not impartial, and also identified numerous other bases for denying recognition under Florida's
version of the 1962 Uniform Act, namely, that: (1) the Nicaraguan courts lacked personal or subject-matter
jurisdiction over the defendants, see id. at *47-49; (2) the Nicaraguan judgment (and the special law under
which it was rendered) offended international due process, see id. at *51, 56-63, 76-77, 84-93; and (3) the
Nicaraguan judgment was "repugnant to Florida public policy" for purposes of the 1962 Uniform Act, id. at
*113-114 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.605(2)(c)). The defendants had also alleged that the judgment was
procured by fraud, but the determination of this claim was rendered unnecessary by the court's other holdings. See id. at *6 n.3. At the time of writing, the plaintiffs have moved for reconsideration of this decision.
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have granted forum non conveniens dismissals based on an explicit finding that Mexico is
an adequate alternative forum. 35 In several of those cases, the U.S. courts have pointedly
36
refused to give credit to generalized assertions of corruption in the Mexican courts. If
these cases are any guide, a judgment debtor seeking to resist enforcement of Mexican
judgments will need to rely upon much more than general claims of corruption, but will
instead need to present case-specific evidence of fraud, bribery, or corruption-as was
done in the three cases discussed below.
C.

A NEW

GROUND OF REVIEW: JUDGMENTS OF DOUBTFUL INTEGRITY

Section 4(c)(7) of the 2005 Uniform Act has introduced a new exception to recognition
that supplements the "fraud" exception:
"A court of this state need not recognize a foreign-country judgment if ...
(7) the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the judgment."9?

The "questionable circumstances" exception does not require across-the-board proof
that an entire country's justice system is endemically corrupt. Instead, as the National
Conference of Commissioners explained, section 4(c)(7) demands case-specific proof in the
form of "a showing of corruption in the particular case that had an impact on the judgment that was rendered" or "a lack of impartiality and fairness of the tribunal in the indi38
vidual proceeding leading to the foreign-country judgment." This contrasts with section
4(b)(1), discussed above, which permits denial of recognition where it is shown that "the
judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide impartial tribunals or
39
procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law," and thus "focuses
35. See, e.g., Langsam v. Vallarta Gardens, No. 08 Civ. 2222, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52597, at *37
(S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) (dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds a business dispute concerning a
property venture in Punta Mita, Mexico); Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Moto Diesel Mexicana, S.A. de C.V., No.
08-10528, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30538, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 1, 2009) (dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds a claim by aU.S. bank that held certain checks drawn by a company based in Aguascalientes,
Mexico in favor of another Mexican company); Wozniak v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, LLC, No. 08 CV
1361, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26952, at *26 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2009) (dismissing on forum non conveniens
grounds a personal injury claim relating to an accident at a hotel in Cozumel, Mexico); Dtex, LLC v. BBVA
Bancomer, S.A., 512 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1022, 1029 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (dismissing on forum non conveniens
grounds a claim against a Mexican bank for tortious interference with contract; noting that numerous courts
"have held that Mexico is an adequate forum for litigation, despite differences in Mexican and American
substantive and procedural law"), affd 508 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2007); see also In re Ford Motor Co., 580 F.3d
308, 314 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that Fifth Circuit case law has "create[d] a nearly airtight presumption that
Mexico is an available forum" in tort cases).
36. See, e.g., Langsam, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52597, at *22 (refusing to credit generalized claims that the
Mexican court system was "corrupt" and that its administrators accepted "gratuities"; noting that "the Second
Circuit is 'reluctant to find foreign courts corrupt or biased,' unless presented with some particularized showing of wrongdoing," and holding that "plaintiffs ha[d] shown no particularized indications of wrongdoing by
any officers of Mexican courts") (quoting Monegasque De Reassurances,311 F.3d at 499); Zions FirtNat' Bank,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30538, at *6 (rejecting generalized claims of "corruption" in Mexico; refusing to
"extrapolate" from the Firstone/Bridgestonecase the proposition that Mexico was "a clearly inadequate forum"
and noting that "a number of courts have held that Mexico is an adequate forum, with no indication that it is
inherently corrupt or otherwise inadequate").
37. 2005 Ur.JiF. Acr § 4(c)(7) (emphasis added).
38. Id. § 4 cmt. 11.
39. Id. § 4(b)(1).
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on the judicial system of the foreign country as a whole, rather than on whether the particular judicial proceeding leading to the foreign-country judgment was impartial and fair."40
Thus, where allegations of corruption are involved, section 4(c)(7) would permit nonrecognition if "bribery of the judge in the proceeding that resulted in the particular foreign-country judgment under consideration had a sufficient impact on the ultimate judgment as to call it into question." 41 Conceivably, it could apply in other circumstances
where the inference of corruption exists.
IV. Three Cases Involving Mexico and the "Fraud" Exception
A.

PEGASO

The dispute between Transporter Aerosos Pegaso S.A. de C.V. (Pegaso) and Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. (Bell) began with a foiled bid by Pegaso to win an aviation services
contract with Pemex, Mexico's state-owned oil company. 42 In 2000, Pemex invited bids
for the provision of regional air transportation services. In preparation for its bid, Pegaso
made arrangements for Bell to supply it with four helicopters, should it be awarded a
contract with Pemex. Shortly thereafter, however, Bell indicated that the delivery dates
for the helicopters needed to be postponed. Although Bell claimed that Pegaso received
this notification well ahead of the bid date, Pegaso claimed that it only found out
later-after it had submitted its bid based on the initial (earlier) delivery dates. In all
events, when Pemex independently learned that Pegaso's bid was based on incorrect delivery dates, it disqualified Pegaso from the bid and awarded the aviation services contract to
a rival company.
In March 2001, Pegaso brought a lawsuit against Bell, in Mexico City Civil Court alleging breach of contract and further claiming that Bell had improperly communicated with
Pemex during the bid process, thereby "disparag[ing]" Pegaso's reputation in Mexico's air
transportation service industry."43 In February 2002, the Mexico Civil Court found in
favor of Pegaso, holding that Bell was liable to pay compensatory damages for breach of
contract equal to Pegaso's "lost profits on the Pemex Contract."44
The Mexican Civil Court then proceeded to hear evidence on quantification. The two
parties submitted reports from damages experts that were $10 million apart, partly due to
Pegaso's expert's refusal to allow for "depreciation of the helicopters over time." 45 Confronted with this disparity, the Mexican Civil Court decided to appoint an "independent
expert." 4 6
40. Id. § 4 cmt. 11 (emphasis added).
41. Id.
42. Transportes Aereos Pegaso, S.A. de C.V. v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 518, 521-23
(D. Del. 2009).
43. Id. at 523.
44. Id. at 523-24, n.5. The Mexican Civil Court also awarded "as much as double the compensatory damages in 'moral damages' for Bell's purportedly outrageous conduct"-"moral damages" being available under
Mexican law "for damages to a party's reputation and honor." Id. The "moral damages" award was vacated
on appeal. Id. at 524 (describing appeals to "Civil Court of Appeals" and then to the "Ampero Collegiate
Court").
45. Id. at 524-25.
46. Id. at 525.
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It is at this point in the quantification process that irregularities apparently crept into
the proceedings. "Immediately after his appointment," according to Bell, the court-appointed damages expert "solicited a bribe" from Bell. 47 As Bell described it,
[O]ne of Bell's [Mexican] attorneys . . . contacted [the court-appointed expert] to
meet with him and to present Bell's side of the case, as is common in Mexican civil
practice. Bell asserts that at the meeting, [the expert] made it clear that he would
sway his opinion for Bell in return for a monetary payment. Specifically, Bell claims
that [the expert] told [Bell's Mexican attorney] that if Bell wanted a favorable opinion
48
from him, it would have to pay him and that "everything has a cost."
When Bell refused outright to pay any such bribe, it received unwelcome news:
[The expert] told [Bell's Mexican attorney] that he was relieved that Bell would not
pay him because he had met with [the Mexican judge] in the interim, and the judge
had asked him for help with the case, as a personal favor, because he had a "personal
interest" in the case. Bell further claims that [the expert] stated that as a result of his
conversation with [the Mexican judge], there was no way he could issue an opinion
favorable to Bell. Bell argues that it was clear to [Bell's attorney] that [the expert]
49
would be writing an opinion favorable to Pegaso.
On further investigation, it emerged that the manner of this expert's appointment was
irregular. Although "Mexican law requires an independent expert to be appointed automatically, with no role for judicial discretion," and that independent experts are appointed
"sequentially from a list maintained alphabetically" by last name, the facts showed that the
statutory procedure was not observed in Bell's case, meaning that the Mexican judge had
50
selected [the expert] out of the "legally required order."
In July 2003, the expert rendered a damages report that "not only agreed with Pegaso's
expert, but found an even greater amount of damages, in excess of sixteen million dollars." 5 The judge accepted the inflated damages figure, eventually resulting in Pegaso
winning a judgment in the sum of $16,599,924.70 and 6,293,198.22 pesos. 52 Meanwhile,
53
Bell's criminal complaints against the Mexican judge were inconclusive or unsuccessful.
In December 2008, Pegaso filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Delaware, seeking recognition and enforcement of the Mexico Civil Court judgment pursuant to Delaware's version of the 1962 Uniform Act. 54 Bell cross-moved for summary
judgment based on the fraud exception, claiming that the Mexico Civil Court Judgment
was tainted by corruption.s Bell submitted evidence from its Mexican counsel, attesting
both to the solicitation of a bribe by the expert, as well as expert Mexican law evidence
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 525-26.
50. Id. at 526.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 527-28.
53. Id. at 526-27.
54. Id. at 528.
55. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 §§ 4801-08 (Delaware equivalent of 1962 UNIF. Acr § 4(b)(2)); Transportes
Aereos Pegaso, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 528.

VOL. 44, NO. 2

DOWN IN FLAMES

907

concerning the judge's apparent deviation from strict statutory procedures in appointing
this particular expert. Over Pegaso's strenuous evidentiary objections, most of Bell's evidence was accepted as competent and admissible by the Court.56
Despite this evidence, Pegaso claimed that Bell had not met its evidentiary burden for
purposes of the 1962 Uniform Act's "fraud" exception. Pegaso argued that Bell had the
"burden" of affirmatively proving by "clear and convincing" evidence that fraud had actually occurred, but had merely succeeded in raising suspicion.57 The court rejected this
argument, holding that, under the 1962 Uniform Act as interpreted by Delaware courts, a
party resisting judgment only needed to present enough evidence such that the court was
not "'satisfied"' that the judgment "'was not obtained by fraud." 58 Noting that Bell had
presented evidence that a bribe was solicited, that the expert's appointment was irregular
and that the judge had a "personal interest" in the case, "coupled with the fact that a
criminal investigation" of the Mexican judge was "currently underway in Mexico," the
court held that it "[could not] say that it is satisfied that the Mexican judgment was not
obtained by fraud."59 Accordingly, it declined Pegaso's request to recognize the Mexican
judgment. 60
Significantly, one of the most hotly-contested issues in Pegaso concerned burdens of
proof, with the court eventually declining to impose on Bell the full evidentiary burden of
proving "fraud" and instead adopting a less stringent test, refusing recognition on the
basis of evidence that left it unsatisfied that fraud had not occurred. As discussed below,
the 2005 Uniform Act changed these standards, placing an affirmative burden on the party
resisting recognition of proving that the adverse judgment was a product of fraud, and also
introducing additional grounds for non-recognition. 6 ' Because Delaware, however, had
not yet adopted the 2005 Uniform Act at the time of Pegaso, and indeed still has not
62
adopted it, this point did not arise in that case.
B.

THE BAJA CANTINA CASE

The Baja Cantinacase is the outgrowth of a business dispute between two U.S. citizens
"with history stretching back 17 years" relating to a business venture in Cabo San Lucas,
Mexico, the Baja Cantina. 63 According to the bankruptcy judge, the case was made particularly complex not only by the "passage of about 15 years" since the parties' original
dispute case, but also the "palpable animosity" between the two former owners of the Baja
56. DEL. CODE ANNj. tit.10 § 4804(b)(2); TransportesAereosPegaso, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 537-38.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 537 (quoting Abd Alwakhad v. Amin, No. L-21-479, 2005 Del. Super. LEXIS 320, at *3 (Del.
Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 2005)).
59. Id. at 538 (citing Abd Alwakbad, 2005 Del. Super. LEXIS 320, at *3).
60. Id. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Transportes Aeros Pegaso, S.A. de C.V. v.
Bell., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59006 (D. Del. July 10, 2009).
61. See 2005 UNIF. Acr §§ 4(b)-(d); infra § 4.
62. Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments
Recognition Act (2005), http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufcmjra.asp
(last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
63. Hoffman v. Greene (In re Burke), 374 B.R. 781, 783 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007), aff'd, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LFXIS 75586 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2008).

SUMMER 2010

908

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

Cantina, John Burke and Richard Greene, as well as (in the court's words) their "lack of
credibility." 64
The business relationship between the Baja Cantina owners began in 1991 and seems to
have collapsed in 1993, when Mr. Greene filed criminal complaints with the Cabo San
Lucas police against Mr. Burke, alleging fraud. In November 1994, Mr. Greene commenced civil proceedings against Mr. Burke in a Mexican court, alleging that the Baja
Cantina's assets had been misappropriated.65 In January 1995, a meeting of the parties
took place before the Mexican judge, which led to a "settlement agreement" and "judgment" purportedly against Mr. Burke for $990,000.66
In 1998, Mr. Greene came to state court in Denver, Colorado, seeking to have the
Mexican judgment recognized and enforced. In his Answer, Mr. Burke responded, inter
alia, by challenging the judgment as tainted by fraud. 67 But before this allegation could be
heard, Mr. Burke filed for bankruptcy, meaning that the validity of the Mexican judgment
eventually became an issue to be determined by a bankruptcy judge in Colorado.
In August 2007, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado ruled on the
validity of the Mexican judgment, and therefore finally addressed the fraud issue. By now,
evidence had emerged not only of the procedural irregularities associated with the settlement, but also of stark corruption within the local Mexican court. Direct first-hand testimony was presented that "the judge presiding over the Mexican lawsuit was given a cash
68
bribe and later became an attorney for Mr. Greene."
It also emerged that judgment was obtained in unusual circumstances. The judgment
was based on a "Settlement Agreement" that had been negotiated and executed "after
hours" in the court. At the time of execution only a Spanish version of the agreement
existed. Prior to execution, the contents of the Spanish version were supposedly read to
Mr. Burke (who apparently did not speak Spanish) by an employee of Mr. Greene. Mr.
Burke was later supplied with an English version, translated from Spanish only after the
Spanish version had been executed. 69 Critically, however, the English version.bore several
material differences from the Spanish original. And it was not even clear whether the
70
"990,000" figure in the judgment was supposed to be denominated in dollars or pesos.
Before dealing with claims of fraud, the Colorado bankruptcy court addressed the governing legal standard. The court noted that Colorado's version of the 1962 Uniform
Act 7 ' did not, by its terms, apply to the dispute because it only applied to judgments from
72
a "foreign state" that had entered into a "reciprocal agreement" with the United States,
64. Id. at 784.
65. See id. at 784-88.
66. Id. at 789.
67. Before Mr. Burke filed his answer, Mr. Greene obtained a default judgment, but this was later set aside
after Mr. Burke established that his answer had in fact been timely. Id. at 791-92.
68. Id. at 796.
69. Id. at 796-97.
70. Id. at 790.
71. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-62-101 to 13-62-112.
72. See Hoffman, 374 B.R. at 798 (quoting COLo. REv. STAT. § 13-62-102(1) (defining "foreign state"
whose judgment would be entitled to recognition as a "governmental unit [that] has entered into a reciprocal
agreement with the United States recognizing any judgment of a court of record of the United States")); Id. at
799, n. 77 (quoting Milhoux v. Linder, 902 P.2d 856, 860 (Colo. App. 1995) ("mhe unambiguous language
of [Colorado's] Recognition Act requires a reciprocity agreement before a foreign judgment will be recog-
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which was not the case with Mexico, or "apparently any other country."73 Nevertheless,
the court held that Colorado courts were also empowered to "recognize a foreign judgment" under "common law" principles of "comity," as set forth in the U.S. Supreme
Court case of Hilton v. Guyor and applicable in Colorado.7 4 The court further held that
the Colorado common law grounds for "nonrecognition" of a judgment were "similar" to
those stated in the 1962 Uniform Act, and thus included a fraud exception. 75
The court held that recognition was not appropriate, concluding that:
[T]he Mexican judgment is so flawed and so tainted with procedural and substantive
irregularities it cannot stand. The Mexican Judgment and the attendant Settlement
Agreement are so questionable as to legitimacy, so suspect as to content, translation
and meaning, and so much a product of evident fraud and related misconduct that it
cannot be recognized by this Court.
The Court concludes, consistent with the [1962 Uniform Act], that the entry of the
Colorado Judgment was not proper, not procedurally correct, and not in full compliance with principles of due process of law.76
Mr. Greene appealed the bankruptcy court's decision to the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado. In September 2008, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision.77
C.

DE

AMANEz

LOPEZ V. FORD

In common with Pegaso and Baja Cantina, the case of de Manez Lopez v. Ford78 featured
evidence of improper conduct involving Mexican court officials, resulting in a tainted
judgment. But unlike in those cases, the suspect judgment went againstthe Mexican plaintiffs. And, bizarrely, it was those same Mexican plaintiffs who were attempting to have the
judgment recognized in the U.S. courts-all in an effort to keep the case in the United
States.
The plaintiffs in de Manez Lopez v. Fordwere the family ofJose Samuel Manez-Reyes, a
well-known Mexican soccer player. In 2002, while driving his Ford Explorer in Veracruz,
Mexico, Manez-Reyes was killed when his left-rear Firestone tire allegedly separated from
the tireback, causing the vehicle to roll over. 79 His family then commenced litigation in
nized and that this requirement does not necessarily render the Act meaningless.")). Moreover, although
Colorado has enacted the 2005 Uniform Act (and, in so doing, has repealed the reciprocity requirement), this
Act had not been implemented at the time of the Court's decision and in any event only applies "to all actions
commenced after August 5, 2008." COLo. REV. STAT. § 13-62-112 (Colorado equivalent of 2005 UmF. AcT
§ 12).
73. Hoffnan, 374 B.R. at 799.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 797, 800.
77. Greene v. Burke (In re Burke), Civil Action No. 07-cv-01947-AP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75586 (Sept.
29, 2008).
78. de Manez Lopez v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liability Litig.),
470 F. Supp. 2d 917 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
79. Cisneros v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. (In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liability Litig.),
305 F. Supp. 2d 927, 931 (S.D. Ind. 2004).
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Texas against both Ford and Firestone in the United States, seeking damages for wrongful
death. The action, along with numerous other wrongful death claims against these and
other defendants, was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana pursuant to the rules concerning multi-district litigation.80
In 2003, Ford and Firestone moved to dismiss the claim on forum non conveniens
grounds, arguing that Mexico was a more appropriate forum to hear the claim. Granting
the motion, the court held that: (1) Mexico was an "available forum"; (2) the Mexican
courts offered an "avenue of redress"; and (3) all other public and private interest factors
favored dismissing the claims in favor of adjudication in Mexico.8 '
Mr. Manez-Reyes's family then appealed the dismissal of their case to the U.S. Circuit
Court for the Seventh Circuit. Normally, the Seventh Circuit noted, the case would be
"an easy candidate for a straightforward affirmance," given the "reasonableness" of the
district court's conclusions and the deferential appellate standard of review of forum non
82
conveniens decisions; but the Seventh Circuit held there was a "wrinkle."
During the pendency of the Seventh Circuit appeal, it emerged that the plaintiffs had
brought proceedings against the defendants in the courts of Morelos, only to have those
claims dismissed. As the Seventh Circuit explained:
[W]hile this appeal was pending, the Manez-Reyes family sued Bridgestone/Firestone
and Ford in the Fourth Court of First Instance for Civil Cases of the First Judicial
District in Morelos, Mexico. That court determined that it did not have jurisdiction
to hear the case, a ruling "confirmed" by the Auxiliary Chamber of the Supreme
Court of Justice of the State of Morelos .... Essentially, the [Morelos] court found
that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Ford and Bridgestone/Firestone. Thus,
on the face of things, it appears that the very first forum non conveniens requirement-an available alternative forum-is no longer satisfied. Mexico, apparently, has
83
refused to hear the case.
Based on this new evidence, the Seventh Circuit vacated the forum non conveniens
dismissal and remanded the case to the district court "so that the district court can thoroughly explore the circumstances surrounding the Morelos decisions." 84
On remand to the district court, however, plaintiffs' case, and in particular their reliance
on the Morelos judgment, completely unraveled. Indeed, it emerged that the Morelos
court's decision was obtained through improper conduct and collusion, apparently in order to fraudulently manufacture a record that Mexico was not an adequate and available
forum. In a scathing judgment, the district judge excoriated the plaintiffs' Mexican attorneys, who, it held, had "acted with the clear purpose of having the [Morelos] case dismissed; and, in seeking that result, manipulated the process to insure that the dismissal
would be based on a particular reason that was calculated to improve the chances of the
dismissal being sustained on appeal."85 Among the court's findings:
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See id. at 929.
Id. at 932-39.
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liability Litig., 420 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2005).
Id.
Id. at 706-07.
de Manez Lopez, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 920.
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* When the plaintiffs' Mexican attorneys were hired to bring Mexican proceedings
against the defendants, their retainer agreement expressly promised them ten percent of the total recovery in the United States "'if they [were] successful in having
the case dismissed.'"86 Thus, they "had an [e]conomic [i]ncentive to [g]et the [c]ase
[d]ismissed." 87
* The plaintiffs' Mexican attorneys deliberately chose to file the proceeding in Morelos court in order to take advantage of a "familial" relationship with a court official-namely, the fact that the court's secretaria de acuerdos ("secretary of orders"), the
court-employed lawyer with exclusive responsibility for reading all motions, recommending judicial action and presenting "draft orders" to the judges, was the sister of
one of the plaintiffs' Mexican attorneys.88 In this respect, the Indiana federal court
found, the sister's refusal to recuse herself was "not based in good faith and honest
public service."89
* As evidenced by a "'smoking gun'" email, the Mexican attorneys engaged in unusual
(and improper) ex parte communications with the court's judges and
administrators. 90
* The Mexican attorneys' "refusals to testify to rebut or explain the substantial evidence against them of bad faith" permitted further adverse inferences against them,
including that they had "orchestrated" the Morelos court proceedings "to ensure a
dismissal ruling in accordance with their plan and intentions." 9 1
The district court held that its analysis of the Morelos order was governed by federal
common law, including Hilton v. Guyot, in which the Supreme Court held that a judgment
could be refused recognition based on "'fraud,"92 as well as the Seventh Circuit's earlier
decision "'for purposes of U.S. law a forum may not become unavailable by way of
fraud."' 93 The court also noted that, to the extent the procedural law of Texas (the state in
which plaintiffs had commenced the case) was relevant, the Texas version of the 1962
Uniform Act would also permit recognition to be refused based on "fraud."94
Applying these principles, the court had "no difficulty or hesitancy" in finding that the
Morelos orders were not entitled to recognition. Based on "[t]he abundant circumstantial
evidence that [they] were obtained by fraud, coupled with the adverse inferences compelled by the Mexican lawyers' refusal to testify," the court concluded that "the Morelos
orders were, in fact, obtained by fraud and thus [were] not entitled to recognition by

86. Id. at 923 (citation omitted).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 924 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 925.
90. Id. at 925-26 (citation omitted).
91. Id. at 928.
92. Id. at 929 (citing Hilton, 159 U.S. at 159-60).
93. Id. at 929 (quoting In re Bridgestone/Firestone,420 F.3d at 707).
94. Id. at 929 n.24 (citing Texas version of 1962 UNItF. Ac-r § 4(b)(2), TEX. CIv. Pexc. & Ram. CODE
§ 36.005(b)(2) (permitting non-recognition of foreign judgment where "the judgment was obtained by
fraud").
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courts in the United States." 9s Accordingly, the court "renewed" its original dismissal of
the claim on forum non conveniens grounds. 96
V.

Potential Impact of the 2005 Legislation's Burden of Proof Provision

As seen from the Pegaso case, the 1962 Uniform Act did not explicitly address who bore
the burden of proving "fraud." When revising the statute in 2005, the National Commissioners recognized this lacuna, noting that "[tlhe 1962 [Uniform] Act was silent as to who
had the burden of proof to establish a ground for nonrecognition and courts applying the
[1962 Uniform] Act took different positions on the issue."97 The National Conference
has since tried to fill this gap by assigning explicit burdens:
* A party seeking recognition of a foreign judgment bears the initial evidentiary burden of proving that it is a conclusive and final money judgment, rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction;9 8
* Once these matters are proven, the evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant.
Thus, a "party resisting recognition of a foreign-country judgment has the burden
of establishing that a ground for nonrecognition," such as fraud, "exists." 99
It is worth considering how the above three cases might have been decided under the
2005 Uniform Act's evidentiary burdens. In de Manez Lopez, there was an affirmative
finding that the defendants have proven fraud, coupled with adverse inferences against the
plaintiffs' non-testifying attorneys. This suggests that the result in de Manez Lopez would
not be different, had the 2005 Uniform Act applied. Likewise, the Baja Cantina court
found that the factual record disclosed "evident fraud." 00
In Pegaso, however, the Delaware federal court explicitly refused to place an affirmative
evidentiary burden on Bell, thus indicating that the court's analysis might have proceeded
along a different path, had the 2005 Uniform Act applied. This is not to say that the
result would necessarily have been different, given the strong first-hand evidence that
bribes were solicited, and that the proceedings had been conducted in an irregular manner-which arguably corroborated the direct evidence of bribery. Even so, the case might
not have been thought suitable for summary judgment.
Moreover, all three of these cases could have been candidates for the new "doubtful
integrity" limb of the 2005 Uniform Act, discussed above. For practical purposes, it may
well be easier for a resisting party to raise "substantial doubt" about the "integrity" of a
judgment than it would be to affirmatively prove "fraud." For example, in Pegaso, there
was an abundance of evidence upon which the "integrity" of the final judgment could be
questioned, over and above the evidence of bribery. The same can be said of Baja Cantina
and de Manez Lopez: even setting aside the allegations of "fraud" or "corruption," the
95. Id. at 929.
96. Id. Certain related proceedings were transferred to the Western District of Texas, where the defendants
likewise sought forum non conveniens dismissal. Although the district court declined to do so, the Fifth
Circuit issued a writ of mandamus requiring forum non conveniens dismissal in favor of Mexican courts. See
FordMotor Co., 580 F.3d at 317.
97. 2005 UNIF. Act §§ 4, cmt. 13 (citations omitted).
98. Id. §§ 3(a), (c).
99. Id. § 4(d); see also id. § 4(c)(2).
100. Hoffman, 374 B.R. at 797, 800.
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parties resisting recognition in those cases had still raised substantial doubts about the
"integrity" of the foreign judgments.0o
The mere fact that these three particular cases involved Mexico should not be viewed as
a general trend against recognition of Mexican court decisions. As discussed above, U.S.
courts have generally been willing to recognize Mexican judgments in the past and they
should be expected to continue to do so. Moreover, U.S. courts will likely continue to
reject generalized accusations of corruption in the Mexican justice system, made without
firm proof in the particular case.
It is hoped that corruption within the Mexican courts is isolated, and that instances of
improper conduct are on the wane. Nevertheless, each of the above cases presents an
example of serious corruption. The evidence in Pegaso and Baja Cantina strongly suggested that an inflated judgment had been obtained by bribery-with obvious and immediate prejudice to the party that became subject to those judgments. The de Manez Lopez
incident presents a case where collusive conduct prevented a final merits judgment from
being obtained, with equally deleterious consequences to the system of justice both in the
United States and Mexico. Each of these cases shows that U.S. courts will treat well-made
allegations of foreign judicial corruption seriously, and will give them a thorough examination whenever necessary to redress the consequences of such corruption.

101. Likewise, the findings in the Sanchez Osorio case concerning the Nicaraguan courts lack of impartiality
may also have satisfied the "doubtful integrity" test, had it applied in that case. SeeSanchez Osorio, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 99981.
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